In the Garante's decisions on the health dossier, the objection is almost always the same: authorised healthcare staff opening the records of patients they are not treating, in a facility that has not limited access profiles and has no log of consultations, or has no alerts flagging anomalies. The sanctions of the last two years in the cases cited here range from EUR 12,000 to EUR 75,000 per proceeding. The decision does not concern the single medical practice, but the principles on which it is based (Articles 5, 25 and 32 of the GDPR) apply to anyone holding health data.
What a health dossier is
The Garante, in its 2015 decision recalling the definition given earlier, describes it as the tool set up within a healthcare organisation acting as sole controller (for example a hospital, a local health authority, a nursing home), in which several professionals operate, which makes accessible information on a person's state of health relating to current and past clinical events. It differs from the Electronic Health Record because the documents are generated by a single controller, not by several independent organisations.
The Garante states in several decisions that the dossier is a specific processing operation over and above the one the professional carries out for the treatment of the individual clinical event, and that as such it is optional: the patient must be able to choose that their information does not flow into it.
A practice's record is another matter: it is the professional's document, not a layer shared between the departments of a facility. But a practice with several doctors, a secretary and an electronic record has the same problem in miniature: several people who can open the data of all patients.
Four cases
| Decision | What emerged | Sanction |
|---|---|---|
| 22 February 2024, Azienda sanitaria dell'Alto Adige | Repeated accesses to the dossier of three patients by healthcare staff not involved in their care. A configuration that allowed any dossier to be opened by choosing a reason from a list. No alerts for anomalous accesses. | EUR 75,000 (three proceedings of EUR 25,000) |
| 11 September 2025, Casa di Cura Città di Roma | The management system logged entries, amendments and deletions, but not consultations; access profiles that did not distinguish between duties. | EUR 12,000 |
| 25 September 2025, Azienda ospedaliero-universitaria di Ferrara | Access profiles that were too broad. The Garante ordered the removal of one access mode and the restriction of a nursing profile. | EUR 20,000, plus corrective orders |
| 10 July 2025, Centro Medico Italiano | The patient's access request (Article 15) not answered within the time limits; correspondence with the patient forwarded in full to their employer, without a legal basis. Little cooperation with the Garante. | EUR 30,000 |
The last case is not a dossier: it concerns a private medical centre and shows that the Garante also looks at the secretary who forwards an email.
Alto Adige: the "authorised" access that is not for care
The proceeding arose from two complaints and two breach notifications. Staff accessed the dossiers of patients they were not treating, despite being authorised on the system. In one case a professional had read her spouse's test results, without his knowledge. The organisation started disciplinary proceedings and, in one case, there was also a criminal complaint.
The Garante alleges infringement of Articles 5(1)(a) and (f), 9, 25 and 32 of the GDPR (opens in a new tab). Three elements weigh on the reasoning:
- Access profiles. The configuration allowed anyone with a healthcare account to access the dossier of any patient treated by the organisation, by declaring one of several predefined reasons. The Garante notes that it was not guaranteed that only those actually treating the patient would access it.
- Alerts for anomalous accesses. The guidelines call for indicators flagging risky behaviour (for example the number of accesses, their type or the period) to guide audits. At the time of the facts there were none. The organisation introduced them after the investigation began: an alert above ten accesses per day on the same patient, and one for accesses without an active clinical event.
- Purpose. The dossier was also open to the medical management for organisational compliance and for consultation of the cancer registry, purposes other than care.
There is also a precedent: the Garante had already intervened on the same organisation with a 2014 decision, prescribing that access be limited to those treating the patient. The measures adopted then proved unsuitable and were not updated after the 2015 guidelines or with the full application of the GDPR. The Garante takes this into account in quantifying the sanction, together with the disciplinary proceedings started and the organisation's cooperation.
Casa di Cura Città di Roma: the trace that was not there
Here the point is the log. The inspection showed that the management system logged the operator, date and time and the operations of entry, amendment and deletion, plus logins and logouts. Consultations of the dossier, no. The organisation stated that it could not answer a patient asking who had consulted their dossier.
The guidelines, recalled in the decision, require that for every access at least the following be recorded: the identification code of the person making it, date and time, the code of the workstation, the identifier of the patient concerned and the type of operation, with logs kept for no less than 24 months.
On authorisations, during the inspection an administrative account could see health information such as admission diagnoses, a nursing profile could see patients from all departments including those discharged since 2017, and a doctor in one department could open the documentation of patients in all the others. The Garante concluded that differentiated profiles for the different duties were lacking. No sample checks on the logs were provided for.
What it asks for, positively
Putting the decisions together, the list of what the Garante expects is short:
- Access only to those treating the patient, and only for the duration of the care pathway.
- Authorisation profiles distinct by duty. A secretary, a nurse and a doctor do not see the same thing.
- A log of consultations, with who, when, on which patient, which operation. Kept for at least 24 months.
- Alerts on anomalies or, failing that, a periodic sample check.
- Training for those who can access.
- The ability to answer a patient asking who has seen their record, within the time limits of Article 12(3) of the GDPR (one month from receipt, extendable by two months in complex cases).
What the small practice can do, the same day
The work is proportionate to the size, but the three things the Garante objects to are also present in a clinic with two doctors and a secretary.
- Everyone has a personal account, no shared passwords.
- Every account has a role, and the secretary's role does not open clinical records.
- Anyone who leaves loses access the same day. It is the operation most often postponed: the risk lies between departure and revocation.
- Someone opens the access log now and then and checks whether there are unusual reads.
- You can answer a patient asking you who has opened their record.
- Those who use the record know what they can open and why.
How Fibonacci does it
In Fibonacci these points sit in two places. The management of users and permissions and the access log.
Users and roles. A team member is invited with first name, surname, email and role, and every invitee receives mandatory two-factor authentication, which cannot be disabled, because these accounts open health data. The roles are in two groups: those who see all the practice's patients (administrator, doctor who sees the whole practice, doctor of one location, nursing staff, secretary) and those who see only their own patients (doctor "own patients only"). The secretary sees patients and the diary without opening clinical records. If the role is wrong, the administrator changes it with the dedicated button: it applies from the next login and remains in the log.
When someone leaves. The "Remove access" button ends access immediately, including sessions already open. The clinical data remains, and visits, consents and signatures remain attributed to that doctor. The operation is logged. There is no temporary suspension, because an "inactive user" field that does not prevent access would claim to have removed access without having removed it.
The access log. Only the practice administrator opens it. It shows a table with the most recent row at the top: when, who (or "System" for automatic operations), what (creation, read, update, deletion), on which record or document, and how it went. The filters separate clinical activity from system activity, and select the type of action and the outcome. To answer a patient asking who has seen their record, you filter by that patient and by a date range and export a CSV file with the rows on screen.
Once written, the rows cannot be amended or deleted, and each row is linked to the previous one, so tampering would be visible. The check has no button: it is done on the server and the result is requested from support. The traces remain for as long as the clinical documentation to which they refer, even after a patient has been deleted, without their name.
A comparison with what the guidelines require: Fibonacci's log has when, who, what, on which record and the outcome. The workstation code, which the guidelines cite among the information to be recorded, does not appear among the columns described, and there is no search by network address.




